This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Edinburgh University Press in The Scottish Historical Review. The Version of Record is available online at: http:// www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/shr.2017.0313 5 the eastern Baltic, under a Palatinate-Zweibrücken dynasty which cared about little more than financial exaction. 8 Similar strategies were imposed on such peripheral territories as Flanders, Hungary and Ireland, all of whom found themselves treated in a semi-colonial fashion by their respective rulers. 9 There is, then, a fundamental conceptual division between 'collaborative' and 'imperialist' policy. Previous studies have tended to suggest that, in the main and despite some suggestions to the contrary, government policy towards the seventeenth-century Highlands largely fell on the 'collaborative' end of the spectrum.
10
As a caveat to the binary 'collaborative'/'imperialist' model, it should not be assumed that the role of the locality itself was necessarily passive. The periphery itself -or, more usually, peripheral elites -could push for greater state intervention or a more integrated state with the aim of sharing in the economic and political privileges enjoyed by the core. 11 That such interest in the potential benefits of state formation had long been apparent in the Highlands is beyond question; certain regional elites has been demanding all sorts of Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 -1788 (East Linton, 1996 6 government interventions, most usually military campaigns, armed garrisons or judicial commissions, since at least the sixteenth century, while the most senior Highland lords, especially the Earls of Argyll, had long-standing reputations for adroit manipulation of state apparatus for local gain. 12 Thus, while assessing how far the 'collaborative' bent of regional government survived into William II's reign, the following discussion will also shed some light on the survival, or otherwise, of accustomed peripheral agency in Scottish state formation.
The Highland problem in the 1690s
Until at least 1692, Williamite engagement with the Highlands was focused above all on quelling the rebelliousness unleashed by Dundee's Jacobites. 13 To that end, and alongside goeing, without any body to notice them, and to giue the poor justice, or redress, for his loss.
17
He had grown even gloomier two years later, when he described the problem as now being so serious that the ordinary mechanisms of justice were effectively useless. 18 The result was that 'Highlander' became increasingly synonymous for many with 'thief', to such an extent, at least in the view of one commentator in the late 1690s, that 'pannalls being hie-land men shall be the causs of ther ruin'.
19
The general discourse of inveterate Highland lawlessness long pre-dated William's reign, and the particular concern about banditry had been very much to the fore throughout the Cromwellian and Restoration periods, but during the 1690s these underlying concerns were sharpened by two additional factors. 20 The first related to the devastating famine which ravaged Scotland throughout the mid-to late-1690s and was felt particularly acutely in poorer regions like the Highlands, one undoubted effect of which was a spike in robbery as hungerravaged individuals sought to ameliorate their suffering. 21 The second, more significantly, 19 policy, and when the more tightly-managed (though still tense) session of 1700-01 duly gave its assent, the commission was renewed in March. The final re-issue, prolonging the commission until July 1705, was passed by Anne nine months into her reign.
49
As an explicit resurrection of Albany's policy, it is hardly surprising that the Williamite commission followed the basic model of splitting the Highlands into separate zones, although since there were now only three as opposed to the original four, the precise borders between them were reworked. 50 The northern division now incorporated all the territory north of the Spey, while the southern no longer included Argyllshire. Only the eastern division remained unchanged. 51 The 1697 re-issue retained this structure, but there was a re-organisation in 1701, which provided for only two divisions -a northern covering and 1694, the same could be said about the powers granted to the commissioners. They were to apprehend criminals within the Highlands and try them at specially-constituted justice courts, which would have the power to impose any punishment up to and including execution. They were to receive the fulsome co-operation of all existing magistrates, and they were to have the power to enforce all existing statutes relevant to preserving the peace. It was also mandated that nobody within the Highlands would be permitted to bring livestock to market without a landholder's testimony, and that armed persons travel no more than seven miles from their homes without a similar pass, two orders which the commissioners were empowered to enforce. All this paralleled the terms of the 1682 commission -often, indeed, using almost identical wording -but there were some key differences. Albany's commission had focused heavily on catching thieves and associated wrongdoers, but the Williamite version also covered murder and manslaughter. Additionally, the 1682 grant provided precise instructions about where and how often justice courts were to be held, guidance missing in 1694, when instead convenors for each of the divisions were named and told to hold courts as often as deemed necessary. Finally, the Williamite commission ordained that the three divisions were to co-operate closely, especially by holding at least one joint meeting per year, an instruction not included in the original grant (although calls for such co-operation did quickly develop). 53 These differences, individually relatively minor, suggest when taken as a whole that the resurrected Highland commission was intended to provide its recipients with a 53 There is some evidence that inter-divisional co-operation genuinely did occur. rather broader law-enforcement mandate, while also giving them greater discretion in how to wield it.
There were other, more obvious differences. The Williamite commission was much larger. Against the sixty-seven individuals ultimately appointed in the 1680s, the grant of 1694 contained 124 names, a figure which was revised down very slightly to 122 for the 1697 re-issue. By 1701, however, numbers had risen to 210, while the final award at the start of Anne's reign brought the tally to 280. But it was not just in the size of the commission that change was evident; it could also be traced in the identity of the commissioners. Albany's commission had consciously sought to involve Highlanders, so that about half of those appointed were members of major kindreds, with most of the rest being Highland residents.
While the revived commission did involve some Highlanders -especially by the time of 
24
infrastructure of the county and effectively making any commission imposed over his head unworkable. 61 The eventual terms were thus a formal recognition of Argyll's renewed power, reflecting again the extent to which the 1682 ambition of engaging with a broader crosssection of Highland society had been abandoned.
A final point of divergence between the commissions of the 1680s and 1690s
concerns the use of military reinforcement. Charles II and James VII presided over governments which were more thoroughly militarised than those of any previous monarchs, and which were also more inclined to use military force to maintain domestic order. 62 But the militaristic bent of the Restoration was as nothing compared to developments under William II, whose reign saw not only a massive expansion of the army establishment, but also a move towards full professionalisation. 63 The effect of this on Highland policy more generally has already been noted, but it can also be traced through the Highland commissions. Albany's commissioners had merely been supported by armed escorts totalling between 100 and 150 men, charged with protecting them and enforcing their orders. 64 From the beginning, the militaristic aspect of the Williamite commission was much more pronounced, not least because a provision for armed reinforcement from Fort William was actually written into its terms. 65 Despite this, additional military muscle was often deployed during the 1690s. In 25 1697, the commissioners of the southern district requested, and were granted, reinforcement from three companies of the regular army, to be posted at Rannoch, Strathearn and Glenshee, 'for stopping and repressing the Convocations of broken and louse men', while the northern commission was simultaneously bolstered by a company dispatched to patrol the Great Glen. 66 Two years later, orders were released for the establishment of six Highland garrisons over and above Fort William's outposts. These were each to be manned by twenty soldiers from the regular army, and were to be sited initially at Blair Atholl, Kenaclacher, Loch Dochart, Kilmahog, Drymen and Achallader, with a seventh, at Findhorn Bridge, added in 1700 -all of which chimed with the wishes of the Highland commissioners, who in a general meeting in March 1699 sought the government's help to combat 'the Troublesome caice of that Countrey'.
67
Such militarism reached its zenith in 1701, when the government resurrected the independent companies. 68 Pioneered in the 1660s and 1670s as a means of providing coercive muscle for a slightly different judicial commission, the independent companies had been dormant since 1678. 69 The ground for their reinstatement was prepared by Parliament, which in January 1701 authorised the creation of two companies of up to 100 men each to assist the 66 NRS, Privy Council Acta, 1696-1699, PC1/51, 216-217. 67 Ibid., 560; NRS, Privy Council Acta, 1699-1703, PC1/52, 86. Another garrison, at Eilean Donan, was ordered to be established in 1701, although this was earmarked specifically for combatting a reported upsurge in Catholic missionary activity in Ross-shire, rather than general peace-keeping.
PC1/2, 217-218. 68 At least one person -James Stewart of Ardvorlich -had been calling for this as early as 1696.
HMC, Athole, 51. Grant commissioned for the northern division's company. Both men were accorded just over £915 of public money to raise a 60-strong force of regular soldiers, as well as two lieutenants, three sergeants, two corporals and two drummers each. 71 These companies developed a general facilitative function, such as arresting thieves for the commissioners to try or guarding their meetings, but they were occasionally deployed for more specific purposes.
Grant's company, for example, was heavily involved in combating the disorders occasioned 
The business of the commission
If the objectives and strategic underpinnings of the renewed Highland commission can be pieced together, reconstructing its actual workings on an everyday level is much more difficult. This is largely because no systematic records have been left; indeed, the only extant minutes of any kind were generated by the semi-detached jurisdiction of Argyllshire, and relate only to a few brief months in the autumn of 1694. 75 
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Anne -thereby setting a precedent which would be followed by post-union governments for much of the rest of the eighteenth century.
139

Conclusion
Under Charles II and James VII, Highland policy had followed an essentially 'collaborative' model, albeit with some authoritarian flourishes, and the original Highland Highland developments also have potential implications for historians' understanding of peripheral control more generally. Partly this is because they offer a rare opportunity for direct comparison between a 'collaborative' policy and a near-contemporary 'imperialist' alternative sharing the same overarching structure; on balance it seems clear that the 'collaborative' incarnation of the 1680s enjoyed rather greater success than its 'imperialist' 45 successor of the 1690s, which might explain why many of the more durable projects in earlymodern state formation tended to be those using the 'collaborative' approach. Perhaps more importantly, the transition from 'collaborative' to 'imperialist' was rapid, facilitated by a changed outlook on the government's part, since William's regime was inherently more aloof, more authoritarian and, thanks to the Jacobite rising, less trustful of its Highland subjects. But the change was not overt, since it utilised few truly new or innovative strategies, instead simply tweaking the existing structures of Highland government to better reflect the new ideological bent. All of this reflects the malleable nature of the early-modern state, and
shows that its approach to outlying regions was neither fixed nor inevitable. Historians must therefore be alert to subtle and sometimes sudden alterations in the dialogue between centre and periphery if they are fully to understand their relationship in the early-modern period.
